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Federal Indian Law — Tribal Criminal
Jurisdiction — Tribal Sovereignty — United
States v. Cooley
Sarah A. Sadlier
ABSTRACT
In United States v. Cooley, a Ninth Circuit panel denied a
petition for rehearing en banc, holding that a tribal officer, who was
not cross-deputized, could neither search nor detain a non-Indian on
a federal or state highway right-of-way through the reservation unless
that individual had committed an “apparent” crime in the officer’s
presence. Narrowly defining tribal police authority, the panel ruled
that the officer conducted an extra-jurisdictional search and seizure.
In arriving at this conclusion, the panel refused to recognize that the
Tribe’s sovereignty affords its law enforcement agencies the authority
to investigate those who imperil public order on the reservation. Its
standard for search and detention posed administrability challenges
for tribal law enforcement and endangered the millions of non-Indians
and Indians living on tribal lands in the process. Fortunately, the
Supreme Court recently overruled the Ninth Circuit’s decision. A
unanimous Court held that a tribal police officer could temporarily
detain and search non-Indian individuals using public rights-of-way
crossing the reservation for violations of state or federal law. The
decision reaffirmed that the Tribe retained its inherent sovereign
authority to regulate non-Indian conduct that threatens the Tribe’s
welfare under the second exception in Montana v. United States. In
doing so, it averted the disastrous consequences of the lower court’s
decision, prioritized workable standards for tribal officers, preserved
the Tribe’s ability to protect its members, and for the first time, offered
insight into the Court’s criteria for what fits Montana’s second
exception.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, courts have consistently eroded tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.1 This trend is particularly prevalent in
criminal proceedings against non-Indians in Indian country and civil
suits against defendants who are not tribal members for conduct
occurring on non-Indian fee land.2 Due to historic land dispossession,
an overwhelming percentage of reservation land is non-Indian fee
land.3 Seventy-seven percent of the 4.6 million people residing in tribal
areas are non-Native.4 This demographic shift has endangered not only
tribal sovereignty but also tribal citizens’ welfare.5 Battling crime rates
two and a half times higher than the national average,6 tribal law
enforcement agencies struggle to maintain public order given their
restricted authority over non-Indians, who face minimal repercussions
for perpetrating non-major crimes on the reservation.7
Recently, in United States v. Cooley,8 the Ninth Circuit held
that a tribal officer, who was not cross-deputized, could neither search
nor detain a non-Indian on a federal or state highway right-of-way
through the reservation unless that individual had committed an
“apparent” crime in the officer’s presence.9 Narrowly defining tribal
police authority, the panel ruled that the officer conducted an extrajurisdictional search and seizure, thereby violating the Fourth
Amendment principles made applicable to tribes under the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).10 In arriving at this conclusion, the panel
refused to recognize that the Tribe’s sovereignty—which
congressional plenary power alone may abrogate—affords its law
enforcement agencies the authority to investigate those who imperil
1

Written in May 2020 for the Harvard Law Review Writing Competition; revised to
reflect developments in the law.
2
See Samuel E. Ennis, Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant,
57 UCLA L. REV. 553, 555–56 (2009).
3
Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country's Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 604–05 (2010).
4
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d 1215, 1236 (9th Cir. 2019) (Collins, J., dissenting
in the denial of reh’g en banc).
5
See id.
6
L. Edward Wells & David N. Falcone, Rural Crime and Policing in American
Indian Communities, 23 S. RURAL SOC. 199, 200 (2008).
7
Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get Away with Almost
Anything, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2013/02/on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-away-with-almost-anything/273391/.
8
919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019).
9
Id. at 1142.
10
Id.
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public order on the reservation.11 This decision’s standard for search
and detention posed administrability challenges for tribal law
enforcement and endangered the millions of non-Indians and Indians
living on tribal lands in the process.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court overruled the
Ninth Circuit.12 It held that a tribal police officer could temporarily
detain and search non-Indian individuals using public rights-of-way
crossing the reservation for violations of state or federal law.13
Importantly, it reaffirmed that the Tribe retained its inherent sovereign
authority to regulate non-Indian conduct that threatens the Tribe’s
welfare under the second exception in Montana v. United States.14 In
doing so, it averted the disastrous consequences of the lower court’s
decision, prioritized workable standards for tribal officers, preserved
the Tribe’s ability to protect its members, and for the first time, offered
insight into the Court’s criteria for what fits Montana’s second
exception.
A. Facts
At around 1:00 a.m. on February 26, 2016, Highway Safety
Officer for the Crow Police Department, James D. Saylor, pulled up
behind a parked truck on a treacherous stretch of road, United States
Route 212.15 Saylor approached the vehicle to complete a welfare
check and asked its driver, Joshua James Cooley, to lower the
window.16 Instantly, Saylor observed that Cooley exhibited “watery,
bloodshot eyes” and appeared “to be non-Native.”17 Cooley claimed
that he had stopped because of fatigue; however, Saylor suspected that
Cooley was impaired and continued his questioning.18 Cooley offered
contradictory answers about his dealings with a man presumed to be
affiliated with drug trafficking, and Saylor requested identification.19
Cooley began breathing rapidly, and his hand hovered above his
pocket.20 Saylor believed this movement signaled his intention to use
11

See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (quoting Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1979)).
12
See United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1646 (2021).
13
Id. at 1642–45.
14
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
15
See United States v. Cooley, No. 16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 WL 499896, at *1 (D.
Mont. Feb. 7, 2017).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See id. at *2.
20
Id.
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force.21 In response, Saylor drew his pistol and ordered Cooley to show
his hands. Cooley complied and produced his driver’s license, which
Saylor attempted to radio into the station, though poor cell reception
interfered.22 Instead of returning to his patrol unit, Saylor searched the
vehicle and spotted a loaded semiautomatic pistol near where Cooley’s
right hand had been, as well as two semi-automatic rifles.23
Subsequently, Saylor performed a pat down and located bags
commonly used to package methamphetamine in Cooley’s pockets.24
After detaining Cooley in the patrol car, Saylor radioed for additional
assistance from Crow Reservation law enforcement and from the
state’s Bighorn County officers, who could arrest Cooley if they
confirmed his non-Indian status.25 While waiting for back-up, Saylor
went to cut Cooley’s engine and came across a glass pipe and plastic
bag that appeared to contain methamphetamine.26 When the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and county officers arrived, the BIA officer directed
Saylor to execute another search of the vehicle, which yielded more
methamphetamine.27
The District of Montana charged Cooley with one count of
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and one count
of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.28
Cooley moved to suppress evidence from Saylor’s investigation,
asserting that Saylor violated ICRA when he seized Cooley because he
was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law
enforcement officer.29 The district court granted the motion.30 First,
the court held that ICRA requires federal courts to exclude evidence
that tribal officers obtain in violation of the act’s Fourth Amendment
counterpart.31 Secondly, invoking Bressi v. Ford,32 it held that tribal
officers cannot detain a non-Indian on state or federal rights-of-way
unless it is “obvious” or “apparent” at the time of detention that the
non-Indian suspect has violated a state or federal law.33

21

Id.
See United States v. Cooley, 2017 WL 499896, at *2.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at *1.
29
Id.
30
Id. at *4–5.
31
See id. at *3–4.
32
See 575 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2009).
33
United States v. Cooley, 2017 WL 499896, at *4.
22
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B. The Ninth Circuit’s Panel Opinion
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and
remanded with Judge Berzon writing for the panel.34 It noted that the
exclusionary rule—which deters law enforcement from
unconstitutional search or seizures35—applies in federal court
prosecutions that use evidence accumulated in violation of ICRA’s
Fourth Amendment analogue.36 The panel acknowledged that the
reasonableness of Fourth Amendment search or seizure turns on
whether the officer either had probable cause for a search or arrest or
possessed reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention.37 Yet, it
proposed that tribal officers should be held to a higher standard when
interacting with non-Indian suspects.38 Whether “a tribal officer’s
actions violate ICRA’s Fourth Amendment analogue does not turn on
whether his actions are lawful under current statutory law.”39 Rather,
the panel reasoned that because the Tribe’s inherent sovereign
authority does not permit authority over non-Indians, search or seizure
may be unreasonable even if the tribal officer has substantive reasons
for conducting it.40
The panel held that Saylor’s extra-jurisdictional acts violated
ICRA’s Fourth Amendment counterpart, triggering the suppression of
evidence from the two searches of Cooley’s vehicle.41 It found that
tribes lack ancillary power to investigate non-Indians on public rightsof-way crossing reservations for reasonably suspected violations of
state or federal law that transpire there.42 The panel endorsed the
district court’s conclusion that during a traffic stop, a tribal officer only
has the authority to identify whether the motorist is Indian.43 In the
brief period encompassing that single question, if the officer spots an
“apparent” violation, then that officer may continue to detain the nonIndian suspect until the appropriate state or federal authorities arrive.44
In all other situations, the officer would be outside the scope of tribal
law enforcement authority.45
34

United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d at 1148.
Id. at 1144.
36
Id. at 1145.
37
See id. at 1145.
38
Id. at 1147.
39
Id.
40
See id. at 1148.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1141.
43
Id. at 1142.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 1143.
35
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The panel also added the caveat that “a tribal officer does not
necessarily conduct an unreasonable search or seizure for ICRA
purposes when he acts beyond his tribal jurisdiction” to the district
court’s ruling.46 The panel proposed a narrow common law exception:
a tribal officer’s extra-jurisdictional acts would not constitute a
violation if a private citizen lawfully could have taken those actions
under the law of the Founding Era.47 Since Saylor’s actions did not
conform to this criterion, the panel ruled that Saylor had no authority
either to detain Cooley in his patrol car until state and federal officers
arrived or to search Cooley’s truck.48
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Denial of Rehearing En Banc
The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a panel rehearing, as
well as the petition for a rehearing en banc.49 Judge Berzon and Judge
Hurwitz co-authored a concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc,
stating that the panel’s ruling did not conflict with past circuit and
Supreme Court jurisprudence.50 In particular, the concurrence argued
that Supreme Court case law supplies two sources for tribal law
enforcement’s authority.51 First, under Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,52 tribes have an inherent power as sovereigns to enforce
criminal law against tribal members or nonmember Indians, though
they exert no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country
and beyond.53 Second, the concurrence conceded that tribes’ sovereign
power includes tribal officers’ authority to investigate and “eject” nonIndians who “disturb public order on the reservation” from tribal
lands.54 The panel likewise recognized United States v. BecerraGarcia’s holding that “[i]ntrinsic in tribal sovereignty is the power to
exclude trespassers from the reservation, a power that necessarily
entails investigating potential trespassers.”55 Citing Strate v. A-1
Contractors,56 Judge Berzon and Judge Hurwitz posited that the
Supreme Court had “definitively ruled, however, that this power to
46

Id. at 1145.
See id. at 1148.
48
Id.
49
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 2019).
50
Id. (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc).
51
Id. at 1217.
52
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
53
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1216 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in
the denial of reh’g en banc).
54
Id. at 1217.
55
Id. (citing United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005)).
56
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
47
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exclude—and so the authority to investigate non-Indians—does not
extend to land within the borders of Indian reservations that is nonIndian,” such as state or federal highways.57 In doing so, the judges
dismissed potentially contradictory precedent in Ortiz-Barraza
v. United States,58 proclaiming that Strate had overruled it.59
According to the concurrence, Saylor was operating outside of his
jurisdiction when he detained and investigated Cooley, a non-Indian
on non-Indian land.60
Judge Collins dissented.61 The dissent lambasted the panel’s
contravention of long-established Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent, as well as state and federal appellate courts’ contrary
authority.62 Tracing over forty years of case law, Judge Collins
highlighted the panel’s ground-breaking decision to deprive tribal law
enforcement of its authority on non-Indian lands within the reservation
both to conduct on-the-spot investigations of non-Indians if probable
cause exists and to detain a non-Indian suspect until state or federal
law enforcement’s arrival.63 To demonstrate this departure from
precedent, the dissent wrote that Ortiz-Barraza supported tribal
officers’ authority to perform traffic stops for nonmember violators of
state law on all roads within the reservation, including rights-of-way
that are part of the highway system.
The concurrence contended that Strate overruled OrtizBarraza, but the dissent distinguished the facts of the two cases.64
Strate’s holding pertained to a tribe’s civil jurisdiction and broad tribal
detention authority related to highway roadblocks rather than tribal
officers’ limited authority to stop suspected criminal offenders on state
or federal rights-of-way.65 Relying on State v. Schmuck,66 Judge
Collins showed that the courts have concluded that tribal law
enforcement’s authority to stop and detain non-Indian suspects does
not rest exclusively on the power to exclude non-Indians, as the

57

United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1217 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in
the denial of reh’g en banc).
58
512 F.2d 1176 (1975).
59
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1219 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in
the denial of reh’g en banc).
60
Id. at 1218.
61
Judges Bea, Bennett, and Bress joined the dissent.
62
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1215 (Collins, J., dissenting in the denial of
reh’g en banc).
63
Id. at 1220.
64
Id. at 1221–22.
65
Id.
66
850 P.2d 1332 (Wash. 1993).
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concurrence claimed.67 It lies in tribes’ sovereign right to maintain
public order on the reservation: a power that necessarily involves an
ability to investigate reasonably suspected non-Indian violators of that
order.68
Both the dissent and concurrence debated the consequences of
the panel’s decision. Judge Berzon and Judge Hurwitz’s concurrence
proclaimed that this case “certainly does not present a ‘question of
exceptional importance’ meriting en banc consideration.”69 Insisting
that the practical implications were limited, the judges denounced the
dissent’s characterization of the case’s legal context as a
misrepresentation, which “wildly exaggerates the purported
consequences of the panel opinion.”70 In contrast, the dissent stressed
that a rehearing of the legal issue was essential because the decision
diminished tribes’ ability to protect the “welfare of hundreds of
thousands” living on reservations.71 For the dissent, three factors
underscored the critical importance of the case: the substantial quantity
of reservation land held by non-Indians, the sizeable non-Indian
population on reservations, and the considerable volume of criminal
activity within reservations.72 It suggested that in a large percentage of
cases, the Ninth Circuit’s decision would have effectively stripped
tribal law enforcement of its on-the-spot ability to detain and
investigate a reasonably suspected lawbreaker for a brief period.73 As
the dissent observed, the panel’s private-citizen arrest authority
applied to felonies alone, meaning that a tribal officer could not
intervene in misdemeanors as soon as a suspect declared non-Indian
status.74 Judge Collins predicted that this decision would produce
unsolvable problems, since states lack resources to monitor highways
crossing reservation lands and tribal officers frequently are the first
responders to investigate traffic offenses occurring there.75

67

United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1232 (Collins, J., dissenting in the denial of
reh’g en banc).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1216 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1238 (Collins, J., dissenting in the denial of reh’g en banc).
72
Id. at 1236.
73
Id. at 1232.
74
Id. at 1237.
75
Id.
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D. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc would have
caused disastrous outcomes for Indian country. It represented the latest
in a string of cases which improperly infringed upon both tribal
sovereign authority and Congress’s power to establish federal Indian
policy.76 In instituting new constraints on tribal policing authority, the
Ninth Circuit restricted tribal law enforcement’s investigatory
authority and shielded the alleged individual rights of non-Indians at
the expense of tribal sovereignty.77 The concurrence invented a
confounding legal regime that did little to lessen criminal activity. As
a result, it left reservation communities to suffer from crimes
committed by non-Indians within tribes’ borders. Fortunately, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Cooley avoided these catastrophic
consequences.78
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cooley fits into a broader trend
of courts seeking to reduce tribal authority. Strikingly, the Supreme
Court decided 72 percent of Indian law cases against Indigenous
interests from 1986 to 2007.79 Since the Court’s infamous 1978 ruling
in Oliphant, the judiciary largely has sought to curb tribal sovereign
jurisdiction by embracing what scholars have referred to as “common
law colonialism.”80 Under this theory, the Court has maintained that
even if Congress has not exerted its plenary authority, the Court may
invalidate any tribal power that it deems to be “inherently lost to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States.”81 However, this
doctrine—implicitly at play in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Cooley—is inconsistent with precedent. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the
Supreme Court held that Congress possesses plenary authority over

76
See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism
and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1263–64 (2001).
77
See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional
Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
479, 488–89 (2000).
78
See PTAN 123–33.
79
Introduction, Developments in the Law—Indian Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1653,
1655 (2016).
80
See, e.g., Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public
Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1835 (2019) (citing Philip P. Frickey, A Common
Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority
over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 81 (1999) (coining the term “common law of
colonization”)); see also Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts:
Applying the Myths and the Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts’
Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 77, 88–89 (2004).
81
Id.
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tribes and their lands and that this power was political.82 This
foundational case established that Congress rather than the courts
should manage Indian affairs.83 Because this precedent has not been
overruled, the Ninth Circuit’s holding contravened a governing tenet
of federal Indian law by mandating new limitations on tribal law
enforcement’s investigatory authority over non-Indians on public
rights-of-way through the reservation without indication from
Congress.84
Courts also have postulated that the rights of non-Natives
restrict the inherent sovereignty of Native nations.85 The Ninth Circuit
concurrence in Cooley asserted that ICRA’s search and seizure
provisions apply more stringently to Indian sovereigns than the Bill of
Rights does to the United States.86 The Ninth Circuit in the denial of
rehearing en banc held that the tribal law enforcement officer violated
Fourth Amendment principles made applicable under ICRA when he
investigated a non-Indian who had not committed an “obvious” or
“apparent[]” felony in his presence.87 This “apparent” standard is an
elevated one in comparison to the “reasonable suspicion” and
“probable cause” standards that state and federal officials must abide
by while conducting search and seizure.88 Moving beyond the plain
language of ICRA, the concurrence opined that such an elevation was
necessary to protect the individual rights of non-Indians against

82

See Ennis, supra note 2, at 573 n.116 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed
a political one . . . .”)).
83
See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799,
827–28 (2007) (citing Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1984) (arguing that “[t]he
judiciary’s frequent invocation of federal plenary power over Indian affairs is curious
since the Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal government a general
power to regulate Indian affairs,” id. at 827).
84
See United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d at 1148 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring
in the denial of reh’g en banc).
85
See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate over Indian Equality,
109 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1525 (2011) (“Thus the same ideas that led to the
termination era—that tribal rights are unequal and unfair—are fueling a
contemporary backlash against tribes.”).
86
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1216 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in
the denial of reh’g en banc); see also Riley, supra note 83, at 830 (demonstrating
how the judicial perception of tribes as illiberal has shaped jurisprudence in favor of
non-Indian rights over tribal sovereign authority).
87
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1216 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in
the denial of reh’g en banc).
88
Id. at 1237 (Collins, J., dissenting in the denial of reh’g en banc).
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Indians.89 This approach contradicted traditional canons of
interpretation, which require the court to narrowly construe ambiguous
provisions in federal statutes that otherwise might be read as invading
tribal authority.90 Tribes possess the right to ensure public safety
within their reservations and to exclude those who disrupt that order—
a power that, at minimum, mandates the modicum of investigatory
authority that Cooley diminishes.
The Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in Cooley
perpetuated a perplexing legal regime that undermined maintaining
public order. Despite soaring crime rates, rural reservations remain the
most chronically under-policed regions in the United States.91 Tribal
officers are responsible for large swaths of land, and if a non-Indian
commits a crime, back-up from state and federal officers may be hours
or days away.92 The panel’s holding made tribal policing even more
challenging by replacing tribal officers’ formerly clear authority to
stop any motorist based on a reasonable suspicion standard with a
bewildering array of rules that depend upon the officer’s knowledge of
the driver’s Indian status.93 In several jurisdictions, if tribal law
enforcement erroneously detain a non-Indian, officers may even
expose themselves to liability.94 Therefore, the panel’s holding
deterred tribal police from performing their duties and incentivized
non-Indians to commit crimes on reservations.95 Some homelands
have become targets for non-Indian drug dealers like Cooley,
confirming the dissent’s real-world concerns.96 By prohibiting an
Indian Tribe from exercising its ability to preserve public order on
rights-of-way through the reservation, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Cooley ensured that a perverse status quo endured.
89

See id. at 1217 (Berzon & Hurwitz, JJ., concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc).
See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 8–9
(1999).
91
Wells & Falcone, supra note 6, at 202.
92
Id. at 220.
93
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1220–21 (Collins, J., dissenting in the denial
of reh’g en banc).
94
See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 1564, 1633–34 (2016) (describing the intimidation and prosecution of tribal
police for detaining non-Indian violators).
95
See id. at 1634.
96
See, e.g., Ian MacDougall, Should Indian Reservations Give Local Cops Authority
on Their Land?, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2017/07/police-pine-ridge-indian-reservation/534072/ (“Drug traffickers,
seeing an untapped market, have actively targeted Pine Ridge for meth distribution
in recent years, law-enforcement officials say. Meth joined a list of factors that have
driven high tribal crime rates in the past . . . .”).
90
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Due to judicially imposed jurisdictional constraints on tribal
law enforcement and tribal courts, non-Indian illegal activity has
skyrocketed in Indian country.97 The legal loopholes for non-Indian
offenders that Cooley exacerbates have inflicted injury on both nonIndian and Indian populations.98 In particular, the jurisdictional crisis
in Indian country disproportionately affects Native women.99 One in
three Native American women is raped during her lifetime, and in 86
percent of those instances, the assailant was a non-Indian.100 Although
state or federal authorities may prosecute offenders, they commonly
lack the conviction and resources to do so.101 In 2011, the U.S. Justice
Department failed to prosecute sixty-five percent of the reported rapes
on reservations.102
Congress has sought to fill the jurisdictional gaps that the
courts have created but has achieved marginal success at best.103 For
example, the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act104 enhanced tribal
sentencing authority and encouraged cross-deputization agreements so
that tribal officers could arrest non-Indians under county
jurisdiction.105 Still, this solution has serious drawbacks: the county or
state may rescind these agreements at will, and tribes may relinquish
sovereign authority by allowing state law enforcement to arrest tribal
members on the reservation.106 For these reasons, congressional
remedies alone may be insufficient to reverse the harmful effects of
the judiciary’s decision-making on reservation residents.107
The Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in Cooley
would have established new restrictions on tribal law enforcement’s
authority to investigate non-Indians. By placing novel limitations on
tribes’ sovereign authority to maintain public order on the
reservation,108 the Ninth Circuit infringed on the boundaries of tribal
sovereignty.109 The concurrence in the appellate court’s denial of
97
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See also Riley, supra note 94, at 1591–92 (discussing the 2013 Violence Against
Women Act Reauthorization, which recognized tribes’ inherent sovereignty to
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rehearing en banc in Cooley reflected the judiciary’s profound bias
against subjecting non-Indians to even minimal tribal sovereign
authority.110 Consequently, the opinion guarded non-Indian individual
rights against tribal sovereignty by imposing a higher investigatory
standard on tribal police than that required of state or federal law
enforcement.111
The Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc sanctioned a
legal regime that infringed on tribal sovereignty and created higher
standards for tribal police officers than state and federal law
enforcement.112 Despite rampant non-Indian criminal activity on
reservations,113 the panel declined to consider the practical
ramifications of its ruling. Without basic authority, tribal officers
would have to abandon investigations of crimes if they were unable to
ascertain the suspect’s Indian status and immediately identify illegal
activity, which criminal actors are unlikely to exhibit in police
presence. As a result, non-Indians like Cooley could continue to wreak
havoc on reservation communities.114 The Ninth Circuit panel
perpetuated the judiciary’s piecemeal erasure of tribal sovereignty,
potentially at the expense of the millions of Americans living in tribal
areas. But the Supreme Court’s intervention in the case forestalled this
outcome.
E. Conclusion
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Crow Tribe of
Indians, thirteen other Native nations, the National Congress of
American Indians, the National Indigenous Women’s Resource
Center, Indian law scholars and professors, tribal organizations,
current and former members of Congress, and former U.S. Attorneys
filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the United States.115 Most amici
punish non-Indians for domestic violence offenses but not “stranger” sexual assault
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110
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emphasized that the 1868 Treaty with the Crow Tribe guarantees that
the United States will arrest and punish “bad men among the whites or
among other people, subject to the authority of the United States” who
“shall commit any wrongs upon the person or property of the
Indians.”116 However, the Treaty states that the United States will take
these individuals into custody only “upon proof made” of wrongdoing,
thus requiring the Tribe to supply this proof.117 The ancillary power to
investigate non-Indians is necessary to preserve that treaty right.118 No
express act of Congress extinguished that right. Even if the treaty right
was ambiguous, per the four “Indian law canons of construction,” the
Court must resolve ambiguities in favor of tribes, interpret treaty
provisions both as Indigenous peoples would have understood them at
the time and to tribes’ benefit, and safeguard sovereignty unless there
is a clear statement by Congress to the contrary.119 The current Court
seemed like it would be receptive to an argument premised on textual
and historical analysis of the 1868 Treaty. Tribes have won several
major victories based on historical readings of treaties in recent
opinions by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Breyer, and Justice Gorsuch,120
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Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Cooley, 593 U.S. _ (2021) (No.
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most notably in McGirt v. Oklahoma.121 If the Court continued to “hold
the government to its word” with respect to treaty promises,122 as it has
in these cases, it appeared likely that it would reverse the Ninth
Circuit’s decision Cooley.
Instead, in an unexpected decision, the Court reaffirmed the
Tribe’s retained inherent sovereign authority to address conduct that
threatens the welfare of the Tribe under the second exception to
Montana v. United States.123 Justice Breyer wrote for the unanimous
court.124 In Montana, the Court held that tribes lack power to regulate
nonmembers civil conduct within the reservation except in two
instances.125 Cooley was the first time that the Court found a second
exception, allowing a tribe to regulate “the conduct of non-Indians on
fee lands within its reservations when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on . . . the health and welfare of the tribe.”126 The
opinion noted that this holding was consistent with Supreme Court
precedent concerning Montana exceptions.127 In prior cases, the Court
had stated unequivocally that it did not question the authority of tribal
police to patrol roads within a reservation—even when it held that the
Montana exception did not apply to other nonmember activity on
highways running through tribal lands.128 Likewise, in Cooley, the
Court’s application of the “second exception recognizes that inherent
authority” of tribal law enforcement.129
But the applicability of the second exception to other fact
patterns may be limited. The Court concluded that the Cooley facts and
the second exception “fit[] almost like a glove.” It observed that the
circumstances of this case were a “close fit” with the second exception,
implying that it was not widening the exception.130 Justice Breyer
Ct. 1000 (2019) (upholding the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision based on
the text of the 1855 Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama Nation of
Indians).
121
140 S. Ct. 2452, 2463 (2020) (holding that the Creek Reservation, which was
established by treaty, remained intact because only Congress can “clearly express
its intent to” diminish or disestablish a reservation, and it had not done so).
122
Id. at 2459 (maintaining the U.S. government’s 1832 and 1833 treaty promises to
the Creek Nation).
123
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cautioned that to deprive a tribal officer of the ability to search and
detain any person suspected of a crime for a reasonable time would
expose tribes to threats such as “non-Indian drunk drivers, transporters
of contraband, or other criminal offenders operating on roads within
the boundaries of the reservation.”131 This list of possible scenarios
satisfying the exception only covers criminal conduct of non-Indians
on roadways.132 Furthermore, it took a criminal rather than civil case
for the Court to conclude that non-Indian conduct imperiled the health
and welfare of a tribe. Based on the Court’s examples, it is unclear
what civil conduct rises to this level of severity.133
Additionally, the Court suggested that this exception only
applies if a tribal officer detained and searched a non-Indian for
violating a state or federal law rather than tribal law.134 To justify this
distinction, the Court cited precedent discussing how it would be unfair
to apply tribal law to non-Indians because they would have “no say in
creating the laws applied to them.”135 A future case might grapple with
inequity of this discrepancy: a Montanan motorist traveling through a
reservation would not be subject to tribal law, yet if the same motorist
drove through nearby Wyoming or Canada, they would be subject to
state or federal laws that the motorist also had no say in creating. The
Tribe, the State, and the country all have a vested interest in
maintaining public order within their boundaries, but only one
sovereign cannot do so on its terms.
Lastly, the Court prioritized the workability of court-created
standards and considered the practical implications of its ruling. It
criticized the Ninth Circuit’s standard, which would have required an
officer to ask or visually identify if a suspect was an Indian, leading to
confusion and encouraging suspects to lie.136 It underscored that the
Ninth Circuit would allow the tribal officer to detain that person if the
violation of the law was “apparent,” a new and untested standard for
search and seizure law.137 The problems presented by this standard
131

Id. at 1643.
Justice Alito’s concurrence also narrowed the holding to tribal police officers’
stops on public rights-of-way through the reservation. See id. at 1646 (Alito, J.,
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133
See id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
134
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indisputably subject’ protects the public without raising ‘similar concerns’ of the sort
raised in our cases limiting tribal authority.”).
135
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Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. 544 U.S. 316, 337 (2008)).
136
Id. at 1645.
137
Id.
132

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW — TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION—
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY— UNITED STATES V. COOLEY

88

TRIBAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21

would arise frequently given that 3.5 million of the 4.6 million people
living in tribal areas are non-Indians.138 Rather than jeopardize the
safety of people living in Indian country, the Court made the fair and
pragmatic choice to adhere to existing standards for tribal officers’
search and detention of non-Indian suspects.
Overall, the outcome in Cooley presents a positive
development in federal Indian law. The Court declined to strip
sovereign powers from the Tribe as previous courts had done. Unlike
the Ninth Circuit, it prioritized workable standards for tribal officers
and maintained the Tribe’s ability to protect its members by
temporarily detaining and searching any person suspected of violating
a state or federal law.139 The future of the Montana second exception
remains to be written, but hopefully, Cooley was merely the first
chapter in the expansion of tribes’ ability to regulate the conduct of
non-Indians within the reservation when it threatens the Tribe, its
members, and the broader public.
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